Abstract: The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 included $88 billion of aid to state governments administered through the Medicaid reimbursement process. We examine the effect of these transfers on states' employment. Because state fiscal relief outlays are endogenous to a state's economic environment, OLS results are biased downward. We address this problem by using a state's pre-recession Medicaid spending level to instrument for ARRA state fiscal relief. In our preferred specification, a state's receipt of a marginal $100,000 in Medicaid outlays results in an additional 3.8 job-years, 3.2 of which are outside the government, health, and education sectors.
I. Introduction
The federal government enacted the $787 billion American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in February 2009 to provide a countercyclical impulse during the worst economic downturn in the United States in at least sixty years.
2 At the same time, state governments, almost all of which have balanced budget requirements that restrict borrowing across fiscal years, had already begun to lay off employees, cut spending and transfer programs, and raise taxes. Rather than concentrate the stimulus in direct federal government purchases of output, the ARRA's authors chose to mitigate this sub-national contractionary fiscal impulse by routing roughly a third of the total through state and local governments. The largest of these programs was the increase in the federal match component of state Medicaid expenditures.
Countercyclical intergovernmental transfers to support sub-national budgets have occurred previously in the U.S. and in other countries around the world. Yet, this form of stimulus has received little attention in the academic literature, compared with the large number of studies of direct government purchases or tax reductions. 3 A priori, transfers could have a small or zero immediate impact on economic outcomes if states simply use them to bolster their rainy day funds, effectively shifting money between government accounts without affecting the overall stance of the general government sector. On the other hand, states may use the money to reduce tax increases or avert budget cuts, allowing the money to enter the economy more quickly than direct federal purchases that require project selection and approval. Reflecting this theoretical uncertainty, views on the effectiveness of state aid prior to the ARRA's passage ranged from then-House Minority Leader John Boehner, who predicted that "direct aid to the states is not 2 The Congressional Budget Office estimated the net effect on the deficit to be $787 billion in February 2009. Subsequent Congressional Budget Office analyses have put the cost slightly higher (see e.g. the January 2011 Budget and Economic Outlook which estimated the direct cost at $821 billion). 3 There is a large literature on the extent to which federal grants crowd out local government spending which was spearheaded and summarized by Gramlich (1977) .
going to do anything to stimulate our economy," to the Obama Administration, which predicted that the state relief would save or create more than 800,000 jobs in the fourth quarter of 2010.
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Even well after the ARRA's passage, disagreement continued, with many Republicans and some economists claiming that no jobs had been created, while the White House continued claiming large job gains.
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This paper aims to fill the gap in our understanding of intergovernmental transfers by empirically assessing the impact of the ARRA's Medicaid match program. The program has a number of features that make it attractive for study. First, the total amount of money distributed through this program is large enough to plausibly generate a detectable effect on employment. Out of a total of $88 billion dedicated to an increase in the Medicaid matching funds, states had received $61.2 billion by June 30, 2010, the end of our period of study. Second, because state Medicaid programs operate on a mandatory basis, increasing the federal share of costs effectively transfers money into state budgets that states can then use for any purpose they choose -the money is fungible. Indeed, many states reported that they had allocated the money quickly to areas that We focus our analysis on the effect on employment because the public debate on the effectiveness of the ARRA has centered largely on 4 See http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28841300/ns/meet_the_press/t/meet-press-transcript-jan/ and Romer-Bernstein (2009) . 5 See http://www.factcheck.org/2010/09/did-the-stimulus-create-jobs/ for a list of quotes from Republicans claiming that the ARRA created no jobs. Also, a survey by the National Association for Business Economics showed that 69% of business economists they surveyed reported that the ARRA had no impact on employment (http://www.jsonline.com/business/82657582.html).
this outcome. Furthermore, high-quality monthly state level employment data makes it possible
to obtain more precise estimates of fiscal multipliers than what is possible with the existing statelevel income data.
The primary challenge to a cross-sectional study is that the amount of aid a state receives is endogenous to the state's economic conditions. Because states that were in worse economic shape received more aid, the OLS relationship between the level of state fiscal transfers and changes in employment understates the true effect of state fiscal relief. We address this concern by using an instrument that isolates the component of the Medicaid transfers unrelated to changes in economic circumstances. The ARRA increased the percentage of Medicaid expenditures that the federal government pays for all states by 6.2 percentage points and increased the match rate by more for states that experienced especially large increases in unemployment. Thus, the level of ARRA Medicaid transfers to each state is the result of four factors: the amount of Medicaid spending in the state prior to the recession; the change in the number of beneficiaries during the recession; the change in the average spending per beneficiary;
and whether the state qualified for an additional match increase based on the change in the state's unemployment rate. The heart of our identification strategy lies in exploiting only the crosssectional variation from the first of these factors, that is, the variation in ARRA Medicaid transfers that results from variation in Medicaid programs from before the recession.
Another set of reasons why a state may have both received more Medicaid funding and had different employment outcomes-omitted factors related to both state Medicaid program rules and economic changes-is not solved by the instrument. For example, more liberal coastal and
Midwestern states both had larger downturns and have more generous Medicaid programs. We present several pieces of evidence that suggest that our results are not driven by underlying differences between high and low spending Medicaid states. First, to ensure that time-invariant differences between high and low Medicaid spending states are not driving our relationship, our empirical strategy considers changes, rather than levels, of employment. Second, in our baseline specification we exploit only differences in Medicaid spending within census divisions rather than between them, and include a number of variables that help predict how a state's employment would have changed absent the ARRA. Finally, we present falsification tests by running our baseline specification on pre-ARRA data and show that in the decade before the ARRA passed, states with high and low Medicaid spending experienced similar employment
outcomes.
An important caveat to our analysis is that a cross-state approach forces us to ignore general equilibrium effects, which could alter our interpretation of the overall effect of stimulus spending on jobs. For example, spending in one state may increase demand in other states, which would lead us to under-state overall job increases. 6 On the other hand, investment could decrease across the country in response to increased government borrowing, though this effect is likely to have been especially muted during the low policy interest rate environment of 2009-10.
Likewise, to the extent that people believe that their taxes will be raised in the future due to the increased government borrowing, spending may decrease throughout the country.
With this caveat in mind, we find that the ARRA transfers to states had an economically large and statistically robust positive effect on employment. Assuming that employment does not persist beyond the time during which it is funded, our preferred specification suggests that a marginal $100,000 in Medicaid transfers resulted in 3.8 net job-years of total employment through June 2010, of which 3.2 are outside the government, health, and education sectors. 7 The effect is precisely estimated, and we can reject the null hypothesis that the spending had no effect on employment with a high degree of confidence. For this result to be economically plausible, states must have used the funds to avoid spending cuts or tax increases. Hence we also provide evidence that the transfers do not appear to have increased the states' end of year balances. In connecting our estimates to the implicit changes in government spending or taxes, our paper also adds to the recent literature on the employment effects of state spending (e.g., Shoag 2010; Wilson 2011; Suarez-Serrato and Wingender 2011; Clemens and Miran 2011) , as well as the fiscal effects of government spending generally (e.g., Nakamura and Steinsson 2011).
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, we describe the institutional details of Medicaid grants and the ARRA stimulus package. Section III contains our econometric methodology and describes our baseline specification. In Section IV, we describe our data. Sections V and VI present our main results and robustness checks, respectively. Section VII provides an interpretation of our results and relates them to the existing literature. Section VIII discusses evidence of a budgetary transmission mechanism, and Section IX concludes.
II. Institutional Details of the ARRA and Medicaid Grants
The ARRA became law in February 2009 at an estimated 10-year cost of $787 billion. Through December 2010, it had distributed $609 billion. 8 As Cogan and Taylor (2010) 9 Elsewhere in the paper, we report that "$88 billion of aid to state governments administered through the Medicaid reimbursement process." Here, we report $87 billion as the amount of money given to state and local governments "through the end of 2010" because, a small amount of the reimbursement to states (about $1 billion) was not recorded until 2011. 10 Another $38 billion went through the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund (SFSF), part of a $48.6 billion appropriation that apportioned the money according to a mix of population of persons aged 5-24 (61%) and total population (39%). Like the FMAP increase, the SFSF was designed to provide relief to state budgets. However, unlike Medicaid spending, there is very little cross-state variation in schooling-age population, making the program less suitable for a cross-state empirical design. 11 There have been many studies examining the determinants of state Medicaid benefits and eligibility criteria. These studies show that Medicaid levels depend on an array of social, political, and economic factors in a state, including income, federal matching rates, and the degree of democratic control, with no one factor explaining the majority of the difference (Baughman and Milyo 2009; Kousser 2002 
III. Econometric Methodology and Baseline Specification

Instrumental Variables Motivation
We begin with a simple framework that relates state fiscal relief to total employment. The change in the ratio of employment to potential workers in a state, , depends on the state fiscal 15 States draw down the ARRA Medicaid funds the same way that they receive regular Medicaid matching funds, as they submit receipts. 16 For example, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi met with a group of governors on December 1 st to discuss the contours of a stimulus bill that would include state aid. See Cowan (2008 Because seasonal adjustment differs significantly across states, our baseline specification focuses on seasonally adjusted data. However, in Table 5 , we present year-over-year changes in employment using non-seasonally adjusted employment changes from the QCEW. 18 Other normalizations (such as the state's entire population) lead to almost identical results. Specifically, in our baseline specification with total nonfarm employment changes from December 2008 to July 2009, the coefficient on total FMAP outlays moves from 2.83 (p-value<0.01) with the population 16+ normalization to 2.78 (p-value<0.01)
We also include a number of state-level controls that are potentially correlated with both 2007
Medicaid spending and changes in employment. These controls are detailed in Section IV and include the lagged change in employment to capture pre-existing trends between high and low Medicaid spending states.
Other Aspects of the Baseline Specification
We focus on two primary outcome variables: change in seasonally adjusted total nonfarm employment and change in seasonally adjusted employment in the state and local government, health, and education sectors. We focus on total nonfarm employment because it is the most comprehensive measure of employment available in our primary data. We also consider government, health, and education workers since the direct effects of state spending are likely to be in these sectors, which contain state government employees, employees of local governments which may have received direct fiscal relief from lower required Medicaid payments and which depend heavily on state transfers for revenue, and employees of many of the private establishments that receive transfers or grants from state and local governments.
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Although we show how our estimates evolve over time in Section V, we focus on employment changes from December 2008 to July 2009 for our robustness checks and our summary statistics.
We begin our period in December 2008 because, as described above, it is the last month before which the details of the ARRA, including the FMAP extension, became clear to the public. We end in July 2009 for three reasons. First, almost all states have fiscal years that run from July 1 with total population normalization. For employment in the government, health, and education sectors, the coefficient changes from 1.17 (p-value<0.01) with 16+ normalization to 1.18 (p-value<0.01) with the total population normalization. 19 To ensure that changes in federal employment are not driving our results, we exclude federal workers from this measure.
to June 30. 20 Thus, employment through the middle of July reflects any changes to government employment that occurred at the beginning of the first full fiscal year after the ARRA was passed. Second, employees in education tend to remain on the payroll through the end of the school year, so July is the first month that would fully reflect changes in the number of jobs in education. This is important because of the large fraction of state and local government spending that goes to education.
Historic aggregate time series confirm that employment changes are especially large in July. In unreported regressions, we compared the historical mean of the absolute value and square of state and local government employment changes for each month. For both measures, the average
July change was larger than that of every other month, and the difference was statistically significant for every month but September and October. An ARCH specification with months entering the conditional variance term as multiplicative heteroskedasticity yielded similar results. The endogenous variable in our baseline specification is total FMAP outlays to a state through However, a regression of all non-FMAP ARRA outlays to states against the instrument (both normalized by 16+ population) and our baseline controls cannot reject the null that the instrument is uncorrelated with other spending (p-value = 0.413). As a further check, when we change our endogenous variable from FMAP outlays to total ARRA state outlays, our estimated coefficient on the endogenous variable remains positive, significant, and similar in magnitude to our baseline specification. of serial correlation, the precise end date barely affects the statistical significance of our results. 21 The ARRA state outlays are from Recovery.gov and exclude tax reductions.
IV. Data and Summary Statistics
Outcome variables. Figure 2 shows on a map the value of the instrument, scaled as described above; states are grouped into six groups of spending per capita. One potential concern is there is substantial regional variation in Medicaid spending. For example, the map shows that New England has high Medicaid spending. Because the employment effects of the recession were distributed unevenly across regions, 25 differences in employment between high and low Medicaid spending states could reflect regional differences in underlying economic conditions rather than the effect of state fiscal relief. To address this concern, in our preferred specification, we include categorical variables for the nine census divisions, isolating the variation in the instrument that comes from within regions rather than between them. 24 To address the concern that 2007 levels of Medicaid spending may be correlated to factors related to the size of the pre-recession boom, we experimented by using 2001 Medicaid spending as the instrument in unreported results. We obtained results similar to, and in some cases larger than, those reported below. 25 A regression of the change in total employment from December 2008 to July 2009, normalized by a states 16+ population, on a set of 9 region dummies rejects the null that the region coefficients are jointly equal to 0 (p=0.01).
In our preferred specification, we also control for pre-existing economic conditions using lagged employment change (from May to December 2008, the 7 months prior to the beginning of our sample period). Adding this control is potentially important because empirically, employment changes are highly persistent. 26 Moreover, while we cannot reject the null that our instrument is uncorrelated with employment changes from May to December 2008, the point estimate for this correlation is non-trivial in magnitude, raising the possibility that high and low Medicaid spending states might have been on different employment trends prior to the ARRA. 27 In Section VI, we explore the robustness of our results to controlling for alternative measures of past economic conditions. In our baseline regression, we also control for GDP per potential worker and the employment manufacturing share. During the period considered, average total nonfarm employment changes were sharply negative.
However, there is also considerable cross-state variation in this pattern. For example, normalized employment changes were more than 5 times more negative for the state at the fifth percentile of the total employment change distribution (Indiana) than the state at the 95 th percentile (Alaska). There is broadly similar variation in the change in employment in the government, health, and education sectors.
V. Baseline Results
First Stage
In 
Baseline Results through July 2009
In this section, we present baseline results where the outcome variable is change in employment in a sector from December 2008 to July 2009. Table 3 The coefficients in Table 4 are less than half of the magnitude of those in Table 3 , suggesting that the "indirect" employment gains in the non-government-related sectors were substantial. To see this more explicitly, we re-estimate our preferred specification, changing the dependent variable to be the change in total employment excluding the change in employment in the government, health, and education sectors. This regression yields a coefficient of 1.86 (95% CI: 0.32, 3.41).
Timing Results
The previous section presented results where the outcome variable was the change in Figure 4 . Again, the 30 In unreported results we find that the coefficient remains similar in magnitude through December 2010 and significant at the 95% level in every month but August. We do not emphasize these results here because (1) the state employment data for October-December 2010 have not yet been benchmarked and may undergo substantial revision and (2) the expiration of the original FMAP increase halfway through FY11 and the ambiguity surrounding possible extension (eventually passed in August 2010) complicate interpretation of the results, given the difficulty in knowing states' expectations over how much the extension would be or even whether there would be an extension. coefficient increases for July 2009, and the standard errors increase over time. However, the ratio of the standard errors to the point estimate is larger than for total employment. Comparing the magnitudes between the two timing figures shows that in all months, the estimates for total employment are larger than those for government employment, with the gap increasing through 2009 and peaking in early 2010. This pattern is consistent with the government employment results reflecting the relatively immediate direct effect of states and state-funded establishments not having to lay off workers, while the total employment results include the lagging induced effects of households responding to higher disposable income.
VI. Robustness Checks and Extensions
Falsification Tests
Our identifying assumption is that, conditional on our control variables, states that had higher pre-recession Medicaid spending would not have experienced different employment outcomes from states that were lower spenders in the absence of the increase in FMAP. One way of assessing this assumption is to consider if the effects we estimate are larger than the relationship between Medicaid spending and employment growth that existed prior to the period of interest. The results show two key patterns. First, the estimates are centered around 0; the empirical median of the estimate is 0.00 for total nonfarm and 0.11 for government, health and education.
That is, in the years before the ARRA was passed, there is little evidence to suggest that high and low Medicaid spending states experienced systematically different employment trends. Second, our baseline estimates of both total nonfarm and government, health, and education employment are large relative to the coefficients in the period before the ARRA. For total employment, our result is larger than all but seven of the 101 pre-ARRA estimates. For government, health, and education, our estimate is larger than all but three of the pre-ARRA estimates. Both pieces of evidence increase our confidence that the estimates reported above are capturing the effect of the ARRA rather than underlying differences between high and low Medicaid spending states.
Other Robustness Checks
Our baseline specification allows for the possibility that high and low Medicaid spending states were on different pre-existing employment trends by controlling for a linear lag of the change in employment. This subsection addresses the concern that a linear lag may not be a sufficient statistic for pre-existing employment trends. Specifically, we report results allowing for a more flexible pre-existing trend and using a state's pre-treatment industry composition and the change in employment by industry in other states to impute employment change during the treatment period, following Bartik (1991) and Blanchard and Katz (1992 Models (2)- (3) 33 Specifically, the logarithm of total employment was regressed against a time variable and 9 monthly lags of itself. The coefficients were then used on data through December 2008 to forecast employment from January 2009 through July 2009. Note that this control variable is helpful if the patterns of employment changes over the 18 year prior to our sample period remained unchanged during our sample period. Because our period involves the most severe recession since World War II, it is possible that this assumption is not valid. 34 The closeness of the coefficients in columns (5) and (6) reflects the benchmarking of the CES to the QCEW.
VII. Discussion
Job-years
Our results indicate a positive and robust relationship between receiving FMAP transfers and relative employment outcomes. To interpret the magnitude of the estimates, we can translate the regression coefficients into the increase in job-years from $100,000 of marginal state fiscal relief. This requires two assumptions. First, we assume that FMAP outlays received through This assumption is likely to be valid (at least for state employment) if states are unable to shift money across fiscal years.
Under these assumptions, the increase in job-years from $100,000 of FMAP outlays can be calculated by taking the integral under the timing charts (Figures 3 and 4) and dividing by 12 to convert job-months to job-years. Our point estimates suggest that $100,000 of marginal state fiscal relief increases state employment by 3.8 job-years, 3.2 of which are outside the government, health, and education sectors. The associated p-value for this calculation is 0.018 for total employment, while the p-value for total employment excluding the government, health, and education sectors is 0.010. 35 Dividing $100,000 by 3.8 job-years yields a cost per job of $26,000.
35 To obtain standard errors, we re-estimate the baseline model using the sum of the monthly employment changes for each state as the outcome variable. That is, the outcome variable for a given state is the sum of employment in January 2009 through June 2010 minus 18 times the employment in December 2008. We then re-estimate our baseline IV regression with robust standard errors. By construction, in both the total and government, health, and
When considering the generalizability of the results, it is important to consider both the intended and apparently realized fungibility of the funds. As noted above, the text of the bill made clear that the funds were for general obligations, and states reported using them for this purpose.
Indeed, results disaggregating the government, health, and education employment results suggest that only about a quarter of the increase in employment was in the health sector, with another quarter in education and the other half in state and local government.
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In the context of our broader understanding of the costs and benefits of fiscal stimulus, state fiscal relief, in particular, may be a particularly low-cost means of supporting employment during a recession. Furthermore, the jobs increases were rapid, perhaps because "shovel-ready" projects were often not necessary; in many cases, state and local governments only needed to avoid cuts.
Comparison to the literature
This paper contributes to a literature which uses cross-state variation to estimate fiscal multipliers. We do this using the most recently-available evidence in a context in which the parameter being estimated has direct relevance to a policy question: how much is employment increased by state fiscal relief during a recession? Although estimated in quite different settings, Suarez-Serrato and Wingender (2011) and Shoag (2011) find estimates which are remarkably similar to our estimate of cost per job, at $30,000 and $35,000 per year respectively. 37 education regressions, the point estimate on FMAP outlays is identical to the estimate obtained above from summing across the 18 separate regressions. 36 When using the change from December 2008 to July 2009 in state and local government employment as the dependent variable in our baseline regression we estimate a coefficient of 0.65 (SE = 0.26) on the FMAP transfers, while changes in health and education employment yield coefficients of 0.21 (SE = 0.10) and 0.29 (SE = 0.11) respectively. 37 See also Neumann et al. (2010) and Fishback and Kachanovskaya (2010) for studies using cross-sectional variation during the Great Depression.
While the political debate has focused on the effect of fiscal stimulus on employment, the academic literature more commonly estimates the government purchases multiplier for output.
Also using cross-state variation, Nakamura and Steinsson (2011) find an open-economy government purchases multiplier of 1.5, and Shoag (2011) finds an output multiplier of 2.1. Our findings are consistent with this range. We roughly map our results to an output multiplier as follows: in 2008 average compensation in both the total economy and state and local government was $56,000 per employee. If total compensation equals the marginal product of labor and workers affected by state fiscal relief have this same average compensation, this result would imply an output multiplier for a dollar of transfers of about 2. 38 Given that the results from this cross-state approach does not incorporate general equilibrium effects, cross-state multipliers, or the response of a monetary authority, we interpret this multiplier as only suggestive of the national multiplier of policy interest.
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A few other papers have also studied parts of the ARRA. Wilson (2011) and Feyrer and Sacerdote (2011) report costs per job of $114,312 and $170,000, respectively, but their numbers are not directly comparable to the 3.8 jobs per $100,000 reported above because they do not account for the timing of job creation and they cover other portions of the stimulus. 40 Sahm et al. (2010) find a relatively modest impact from the Making Work Pay tax cut. Mian and Sufi (2010) find that the relatively small ($3 billion) "Cash for Clunkers" program (which was 38 This calculation assumes that capital stays fixed. Data on average compensation per employee come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis GDP-by-Industry accounts. The output multiplier equals the jobs multiplier multiplied by value-added per job (equivalent to a worker's marginal product), or (3.8/$100,000)*$56,000=2.13. 39 Nakamura and Steinsson (2011) and Shoag (2011) explore the theoretical mapping from these estimates of local fiscal multipliers to the national multiplier in an open economy setting. 40 Wilson's results for total job creation are closest to ours. This is not surprising, since his paper adopts our instrument, along with using simulated instruments for highway and education spending. The Feyrer-Sacerdote number corresponds only to "direct jobs" funded by the ARRA. Conley and Dupor (2011) 
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There are essentially only three ways in which states could use the ARRA state fiscal relief funds: to alleviate program cuts, to prevent or lower tax and fee increases, or to contribute to their end of year balances (which include their rainy day funds). As long as the states did not respond to the federal transfers by completely siphoning them to their end of year balances, the observed employment responses could come from multipliers on the states' spending or tax 41 The Obama Administration (Council of Economic Advisers 2010), Congressional Budget Office (2010b) and private forecasters and academics (Blinder and Zandi 2010) have all evaluated the ARRA using a multiplier model based on historical relationships between government spending, output and employment. These studies tend to find effects similar to or slightly smaller in magnitude than those in the current study for state fiscal relief. However, they are all calibrated models, whereas the current study uses empirical estimation. Council of Economic Advisers (2009) reported preliminary results to those in the current paper. actions. 46 The results in Section V suggest that the ARRA funds were at least partially used to avoid program cuts, since a concentration of the employment effects appears to have occurred in sectors (government, health, and education) which are reliant on state funds. That total employment beyond those sectors is also affected positively by the federal fiscal relief suggests that there is a source of spillovers, arising from higher disposable income due to either the wages of the direct hires or lower net taxes because of fewer tax or fee increases.
We can directly test the necessary condition that FMAP outlays affected spending or tax actions by regressing the change in end of year balances from 2008 to 2009 on instrumented FMAP outlays and controls. Models (1) - (3) of Table 6 summarize the results of these regressions.
All else equal, if states that received more FMAP money decreased their balances less, we would expect a positive and significant coefficient on FMAP outlays, with the extreme case that if all of the money were saved we would expect a coefficient of 1. Instead, the estimates in (1) - (3) are small in magnitude, negative in all three of the specifications, and never significantly different from 0. 47 Furthermore, the models allow us to reject the null that half of transfers were saved by states at the 99% confidence level for two regressions and at the 95% confidence level for the third, confirming that at least some of the funds were used to slow either budget cuts or tax increases. Models (4) - (6) of Table 6 repeat the same exercise, using the change in end of the 46 Several recent empirical studies have found a positive effect of lower taxes or higher transfers on economic outcomes (Johnson, Parker and Souleles 2006; Sahm, Shapiro and Slemrod 2009; Romer and Romer 2010) . Empirical evidence on the effect of spending changes is more mixed (Blanchard and Perotti 2002; Hall 2009; Ramey 2009; Barro and Redlick 2010) . Theoretical results in Woodford (2011) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011) and empirical work by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011) emphasize that the spending multiplier may differ depending on the state of the business cycle and the stance of monetary policy, with the punch-line that the depressed demand and zero interest rate policy that prevailed during our period of study should produce maximal spending multipliers. 47 Throughout these regressions, we exclude Alaska, a state that experienced a per 16+ population decline in its end of year funds that was more than ten times larger than that of the next largest states, Wyoming ( To determine if states that received more transfers cut their budgets less, we ran specifications that parallel those in Table 6 where the outcome variable was the change in expenditure Unfortunately, the results from this regression are quite noisy, and we can neither reject the null that all of the money was spent on reducing budget cuts (which would imply a coefficient of one)
nor the null that none of the money was spent on reducing budget cuts (which would yield a coefficient of zero). 50 Results using changes in a state's revenue are similarly noisy, and thus do not provide conclusive evidence about the use of funds to reduce tax or fee increases. Further research into how states optimize over the margins of tax and spending when faced with an altered budget constraint would be a worthwhile area of future study. 48 Papers by Poterba (1994) and Alt and Lowry (1994) examine how the states' balanced budget rules affect their responses to deficits and find that in response to a positive deficit shock, states cut expenditures or raise taxes within either the current or the following fiscal year. This is consistent with the findings that a federal transfer (a negative deficit shock) would impact expenditures or taxes. 49 These results contradict those of Cogan and Taylor (2010) , who find using aggregate time-series data that ARRA Medicaid spending increased aggregate state net lending as measured in the National Income and Product Accounts. 
IX. Conclusion
This paper estimates the employment effects of a relatively unstudied form of government macroeconomic intervention that took center stage in the recent ARRA: fiscal relief to states during a downturn. We exploit cross-state variation in transfer receipts that comes from prerecession differences in Medicaid spending. All else equal, states that spent more money on
Medicaid before the recession received more money from the federal government. We confront the major threat to identification-that states that spent more money on Medicaid may be on differential employment trends from states that spent less-in several ways, including adding regional fixed effects and other control variables as well as conducting placebo tests. Our baseline specifications suggest that $100,000 of marginal spending increased employment by 3.8 job-years, 3.2 of which are outside the government, health, and education sectors. The construction of the instrument is described in the text. "Baseline controls" are vote share Kerry, union share, GDP per person 16+, employment in manufacturing, state population, and region fixed effects. Sources of control variables are detailed in the data appendix. See the text for the construction of forecasted and imputed employment change. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level. ** significant at the 5% level. *** significant at the 1% level.
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